We presented children aged 6, 8, and 10 years with a video and then an audio tape about a dog named Mick. Some information was repeated in the two sources and some was unique to one source. We examined: (a) children's hit rate for remembering whether events occurred and their tendency to make false alarms, (b) their memory for the context in which events occurred (source monitoring), (c) their certainty about hits, false alarms, and source, and (d) whether working memory and inhibition were related to hits, false alarms, and source monitoring. The certainty ratings revealed deficits in children's understanding of when they had erred on source questions and of when they had made false alarms. In addition, inhibitory ability accounted for unique variance in the ability to avoid false alarms and in some kinds of source monitoring but not hits. In contrast, working memory tended to correlate with all forms of memory including hits.
they just imagined or actually said something (Foley, Johnson, & Raye, 1983) . Several factors affect performance. Younger children do worse when the same rather than different actors and actions are involved (Day, Howie, & Markham, 1998) , when the memory test is delayed rather than immediate (Parker, 1995) , and when the sources are highly similar (Lindsay et al., 1991) .
Memory for the source of an event is thought to differ from, and fade more rapidly than, content forgetting (e.g., "Did event X occur?") which draws on semantic memory (Schacter, 1987; Schacter, Kaszniak, Kihlstrom, & Valdiserri, 1991) . Wheeler, Stuss, and Tulving (1987) cite source amnesia as a prototypical example of episodic memory. In this sense, one remembers the learning episode itself, whereas in semantic memory one might simply know an event occurred because one has been told so. For several reasons it is likely that episodic memory and source monitoring are skills that develop slowly over childhood (Wheeler et al., 1997) .
First, the development of episodic memory and source monitoring are typically linked to development of the frontal lobes (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993; Schacter et al., 1995; Wheeler et al., 1997) , which do not fully mature until adolescence or later (e.g., Thatcher, 1992; Yakovlev & LeCours, 1967) . Past research supports a link between the frontal lobes and source monitoring but not other forms of memory (Janowsky, Shimamura, & Squire, 1989; Milner, 1971; Milner, Petrides, & Smith, 1985; Schacter, 1987; Schacter et al., 1995; Shimamura, Janowsky, & Squire, 1990 ; see Wheeler et al., 1997 , for a review). For instance, Glisky, Polster, and Routhieaux (1995) found a relation between source amnesia and performance on a battery of executive function tasks in a group of elderly adults (who are known to experience frontal lobe deterioration). Likewise, Craik, Morris, Morris, and Loewen (1990) found a correlation in the elderly between source monitoring scores, the Wisconsin Card Sorting task, and a verbal fluency task. Verbal fluency is typically thought to measure inhibitory ability due to the tendency of participants to perseverate, and the Wisconsin is typically thought to measure working memory and inhibitory ability.
In addition to source monitoring errors, there is a wealth of evidence linking an increase in false alarm rates (incorrectly saying an item had occurred when it had not occurred) to frontal lobe pathology (e.g., Melo, Winocur, & Moscovitch, 1999; Parkin, Bindschaedler, Harsent, & Metzler, 1996; Parkin & Leng, 1993; Parkin, Ward, Bindschaedler, Squires, & Powell, 1999; Rapcsak, Reminger, Glisky, Kaszniak, & Comer, 1999; Schacter, Curran, Galluccio, Milberg, & Bates, 1996) , and the normal aging process (Balota et al., 1999; Kensinger & Schacter, 1999) , as well as childhood (Brainerd & Reyna, 1998) . Researchers have linked false alarms to a poorly focused event description at retrieval (Balota et al., 1999; Schacter et al., 1996) . For instance, rather than relying on conscious verbatim memory, one might remember simply that one heard "a bunch of story events," and accept unpresented events because they fit the gist of the prior events (Brainerd & Reyna, 1998; Holliday & Hayes, 2000; Melo et al., 1999; Rapcsak et al., 1999; Ward et al., 1999) . Rybash and Hrubi-Bopp (2000) extend these arguments by linking false alarms to source memory. False alarms can be avoided if a familiar item's context can be clearly distinguished from the experimental context.
In sum, the frontal lobes have been linked to two kinds of memory errorsincorrect source monitoring and false alarms-and deficient strategic processes and inhibitory deficits are thought to be related to both. Although Schacter (1987) argues that source monitoring does not necessarily require executive abilities and the two tend to co-occur simply because they rely on the same brain regions, Wheeler et al. (1997) argue that source monitoring actually requires executive abilities. This is because source monitoring relies on strategic processes which themselves require some ability for self-reflection (see also Friedman, 1993; Johnson et al., 1993) . For instance, one must reflect on the goal and the best strategies for achieving the goal and inhibit suboptimal processes that will interfere with goal attainment. Importantly, strategic processes are known to develop slowly over childhood (Flavell, 1985) . In the same vein, others have argued more generally for a close link between executive functions and self-awareness (e.g., Dienes & Perner, 1999; Perner, 2000) .
In the present study we aimed to build on this theoretical background in two main ways. Children saw a video and then heard an audiotape about a set of events. Some information in the audiotape was novel and some was repeated. They were then asked recognition questions about whether particular events had occurred and source questions about which context they had occurred in. We examined the relation between: (a) source monitoring, hits, and false alarms, and (b) executive function development in children. Based on previous research and on developmental theories such as that of Roberts and Pennington (1996) , we used two tests of executive function: working memory and a Stroop task as a measure of inhibition. Second, we examined children's certainty when they made judgments about which items had previously occurred or not occurred and in which context they had occurred.
We made several predictions. First, we did not expect a relation between hits and executive function abilities because hits can be achieved purely through familiarity with no strong demands on inhibition. In contrast, we did expect a relation between false alarms and the Stroop task given the common inhibitory component. In addition, a relation between false alarms and working memory might be expected because: (a) the strategic processes associated with avoiding false alarms (e.g., self-monitoring, attempts to consider an event's context) might benefit from a good working memory (Siegler, 1991) , and (b) avoiding false alarms might rely on source memory (see above).
Regarding source monitoring, we expected that events that occur in only one of two sources (as opposed to both sources or neither source) will be better tests of source understanding. Memory for multiple presentations of a stimulus is better than memory for single presentations (Marche, 1999; Pezdek & Roe, 1995) . Hence, when an event occurs in both sources the familiarity cues might be sufficiently strong to allow an inference that the event has occurred in both sources.
With a single presentation of the event, there will be familiarity cues but episodic information is needed to identify the item's context, and success requires inhibition of automatic familiarity-based retrieval processes. Hence, the relation between inhibitory abilities and source monitoring should be particularly strong for such items. Events that occur in neither source essentially tap children's ability to avoid false alarms and, for the reasons listed above, should correlate with inhibitory abilities.
The link between working memory and source monitoring is expected because of the common need for consciously mediated, working memory-dependent strategic processing and the insight into context required in both tasks (e.g., in the working memory task, remembering which digit was presented first, second, and so forth). Indeed, working memory links directly to source monitoring, whereas it links more indirectly to false alarms (i.e., is linked to the extent that false alarms require source monitoring). Hence, we might expect working memory to link more clearly to source monitoring than to false alarms.
The second aim of our study was to examine correlations between certainty ratings and performance on the recognition and source questions. We assume that certainty is based both on an event's familiarity and the extent to which contextual information is present. If children were less confident when they erred on a recognition or source question then they would have realized when their answer was possibly incorrect. If such positive correlations were obtained, then false alarms and source monitoring errors would need to be rethought; despite their errors, children would have insight into when they were guessing. If children showed no awareness of when they were wrong then this too would be interesting information, suggesting that they genuinely fail to recognize other conclusions are possible.
We also gave children a vocabulary test as a measure of general intelligence and language ability. This would allow us to determine whether any relations between executive function abilities and memory are independent of verbal ability and intelligence.
METHOD

Participants
Participants included 22 6-year-olds (mean ϭ 5.65 years; range ϭ 5.17 to 6.08 years; 13 girls and 9 boys), 19 8-year-olds (mean ϭ 8.23 years; range ϭ 7.92 to 8.75 years; 10 girls and 9 boys), and 20 10-year-olds (mean ϭ 10.38 years; range ϭ 9.92 to 10.83 years; 12 girls and 8 boys). Children were from a middle-class primary school in a predominantly White area of a mid-sized city in the United Kingdom.
Materials and Scoring
First, we gave children a warm-up phase that included two short stories, either seven or eight lines long, each illustrated by two drawings. The experimental phase included a 5-min videotape about a dog named Mick and then a 3-min audiotape that recounted eight events that occurred in the video and introduced eight new events that had not occurred in the video. Children were asked 16 Happen questions (e.g., "What do you think? Did the newspaper boy walk down the path to the house?"). For four of these questions the correct answer was that the event had not occurred and for 12 it was that the event had occurred. Regardless of their answer to the Happen questions, children were also asked 16 corresponding Source questions (e.g., "What do you think? Did the newspaper boy walk down the path to the house in only the tape, only the video, in both, or in neither?"). For four of the Source questions, the event had occurred only in the video, for four the event had occurred only in the tape, for four it had occurred in both, and for four it had occurred in neither.
A rating scale was used to rate certainty. The scale had nine squares aligned horizontally that progressed from a thumbs-up sign ("9") to a thumbs-down sign ("1"). Children placed a small cardboard counter on one of the squares to rate their certainty in a particular answer. For instance, for the Happen question the experimenter said, "You said the newspaper boy did walk down the path to the house. So, how sure are you that he did? Use the counter to show me." For the Source question, for a child who said the event occurred in the tape only, the experimenter said, "You said the newspaper boy walked down the path to the house only in the tape. So, how sure are you that it was only in the tape? Use the counter to show me." Separate certainty ratings were obtained for all Happen and Source questions.
In the working memory task we showed children a row of three digits and asked them to read aloud each digit. The digits were viewed through a card with a hole that allowed viewing of one row only. For instance, the first items included two rows, each with three digits (e.g., 8 1 4, 5 3 9). The child was told to remember only the last digit of each row and to remember each of these digits in the order they were presented ("4, 9"). The most difficult items consisted of five rows, each with three digits. A point was given for each digit correctly remembered and for each pair of digits remembered in the correct order (maximum was 144.).
The measure of inhibitory ability was a Stroop task. In the 90 items of the conflict condition children were shown rows of digits presented on a computer screen for 1 s (e.g., 2 2 2). Their task was to count the number of digits presented and press the corresponding number on the keypad (e.g., "3"). Thus, children had to inhibit the automatic tendency to decode the digit ("2"). In the 45 items of the control condition a failure to inhibit decoding would not lead to the same level of conflict because a response to the automatic tendency was not available (e.g., D D). There were 1.8 s between the offset of one item and the onset of the subsequent item, and children had to respond within 2.5 s from the onset of a stimulus to record a response. Inhibitory errors were counted only when the child pressed a key that indicated a failure to inhibit automatic decoding tendencies (e.g., pressing "2" in the example above). If the child pressed a number other than "2" or "3" (correct), or failed to respond, then this item was not included when calculating proportion correct. Hence, inhibitory errors were not possible for the control items.
Our main interest in the Stroop task was in the number of errors made rather than reaction time. Research shows that reaction times slow in the conflict con-dition relative to the control condition (Tipper, Bourque, Anderson, & Brehaut, 1989) and that older children slow less. Slowing is predictable due to the increase in interference. We were more interested in the breakdown of inhibitory processes (errors) even when children slowed for the conflict items and whether these related to false alarms and source monitoring errors.
As a measure of intelligence and verbal ability children were given the vocabulary subtest of the Weschler Scale of Intelligence for Children. The maximum possible score on this test was 60. The source monitoring tasks were always given first, followed by the executive function and vocabulary tasks.
Procedure and Design
The warm-up phase included two story pairs. Children were asked six questions regarding whether particular events had occurred and, for each event, which of two contexts it had occurred in. Certainty about events should have varied because some events occurred in both stories, others in one story only, others in neither story, and others were left ambiguous as to their occurrence. This phase familiarized children with the requirements of the experimental phase but included no specific training.
In the experimental phase the experimenter introduced the video simply by saying, "And now we will watch a video," and the audiotape by saying, "And now we will listen to a tape." The experimenter played the audiotape immediately after the child watched the video and gave children the Happen and Source questions immediately after the audiotape had finished. The video was always given first in order to roughly mimic typical real life events as they might pertain to eyewitness testimony (first seeing an event and then later hearing it described differently). examined using three separate analyses of variance with age as the independent measure. Only in the analysis for d´was the effect for age significant, F(2, 58) ϭ 4.82, p Ͻ .05. Here and elsewhere we used t tests to examine mean differences, employing Holms correction to reduce the family-wise error rate to p Ͻ .05. The 10-year-olds had a significantly higher d´score than 6-and 8-year-olds, with no difference between 6-and 8-year-olds.
RESULTS
Performance on the Happen and Source questions.
The Source questions were analyzed with a 3 (age: 6 versus 8 versus 10) ϫ 4 (source: tape only versus video only versus both tape and video versus neither tape nor video) analysis of variance, with main effects for age, F(2, 58) ϭ 31.82, p Ͻ .001, and source, F(3, 174) ϭ 24.75, p Ͻ .001. The interaction approached significance, F(6, 174) ϭ 1.88, p ϭ .08. Scores for children aged 6 years were significantly lower than for age 8, t(39) ϭ 4.97, p Ͻ .001, and age 10, t(40) ϭ 6.91, p Ͻ .001, with the difference between age 8 and 10 approaching significance, t(37) ϭ 1.82, p Ͻ .08. In addition, children were significantly worse on the video only Source questions than (a) the neither Source questions, t(60) ϭ 4.63, p Ͻ .001, and (b) the both Source questions, t(60) ϭ 7.32, p Ͻ .001, and were worse on the tape only Source questions than (a) the neither Source questions, t(60) ϭ 4.11, p Ͻ .001, and (b) the both Source questions, t(60) ϭ 6.32, p Ͻ .001. Table 2 reveals that children tended to err on the video only Source questions by saying that the event occurred in both sources and to err on the tape only Source questions by saying that the event occurred in neither or both sources.
t-tests showed that within each age group, children were well above chance on hits, false alarms, the both Source questions, and the neither Source questions (all ps Ͻ .05). Furthermore, children aged 8 and 10 years were above chance in the video only and tape only Source questions (all ps Ͻ .05). In general, then, children understood the format of our questions, but children aged 6 did not do well on the Source questions with the highest episodic memory component, and children aged 8 and 10 were well below ceiling on these questions.
Consistency between the Happen and Source questions. One concern is that children might say an event did not occur but then contradict themselves by saying it occurred in the video, tape, or both sources. Conversely, they might say that an event did occur but then say that it did not occur in either source. Contradictions of this kind might be partially caused by uncertainty regarding the correct answer or alternatively by confusion regarding the test questions. For each Happen question and the corresponding Source question we counted the number of children who gave consistent answers. Over all 16 pairs of questions, the mean number of children giving consistent answers was 53.25 out of 61. In general, then, children were consistent on the two kinds of questions, again lending support to the idea that children understood our questions. Certainty. Table 3 presents the mean certainty ratings for the Happen and Source questions. Certainty scores on the Happen questions were analyzed with a 3 (age) ϫ 2 (question type) analysis of variance, which revealed main effects for age, F(2, 58) ϭ 5.15, p Ͻ .01, and question type, F(1, 58) ϭ 41.06 p Ͻ .001, but not the interaction. Scores for age 6 were significantly lower than for age 8, t(39) ϭ 2.63, p Ͻ .05, and age 10, t(40) ϭ 2.20, p Ͻ .05, with no difference between ages 8 and 10. The main effect for question type indicated that children were less certain on the questions for which false alarms were possible than on the questions for which hits were possible.
Certainty scores on the Source questions were analyzed with a 3 (age) ϫ 4 (question type) analysis of variance, revealing main effects for age, F(2, 58) ϭ 4.45, p Ͻ .05, and question type, F(3, 174) ϭ 6.63, p Ͻ .001, but not the interaction. Follow-up tests on the age effect revealed only one significant effect: age 6 scores were significantly lower than age 8, t(39) ϭ 2.61, p Ͻ .05. Follow-up tests for question type revealed that children were more confident on the both Source questions than (a) the neither Source questions, t(60) ϭ 3.67, p Ͻ .01, and (b) the video Source questions, t(60) ϭ 3.39, p Ͻ .01. In addition, they were more certain on the tape only Source questions than the neither Source questions, t(60) ϭ 2.63, p Ͻ .05. In sum, over all question types the data for age group converge in that confidence tends to increase as children grow older. Over all age groups the data for question type converge in that certainty tends to be highest on events that would be most familiar (the "Yes" Happen questions and the both Source questions).
We also examined whether children were more certain of an answer to a question when they were correct than when they were incorrect by correlating perform-102 RUFFMAN ET AL. ance and certainty for (a) Happen questions and (b) Source questions. The data are shown in Tables 4 and 5 . There were only three significant negative correlations, whereas there were 37 significant positive correlations, a pattern much different than would be expected by chance; binomial test, k ϭ 37, n ϭ 40, p Ͻ .001. For this reason we ignore negative correlations below. In all age groups there were numerous significant correlations for memory items for which familiarity was a sufficient cue (i.e., hits and the both Source questions). This shows that children in all three age groups were able to rate certainty on at least some types of questions and that certainty ratings were sensitive measures of confidence. In contrast, there were fewer significant correlations (particularly in the younger group) for memory items for which inhibition and contextual information were needed (i.e., false alarms, video only, tape only, and neither Source questions). This demonstrates a genuine lack of understanding of when they had erred. variables were highly correlated with age group-Stroop, r ϭ .71; working memory, r ϭ .80; vocabulary, r ϭ .83 (all ps Ͻ .001). We then examined Stroop by comparing reaction times on the conflict items (mean ϭ 1170 ms) to reaction times on the control items (mean ϭ 1099 ms). Consistent with Tipper et al. (1989) , children were significantly slower on the conflict items, t(60) ϭ 7.99, p Ͻ .001. For the reasons stated earlier, we used proportion correct on the conflict items as our measure of inhibition in subsequent analyses.
Relation of hits, false alarms, and source memory to executive functions.
In all analyses we considered how working memory and Stroop errors correlated with Happen or Source question performance after partialling out vocabu-104 RUFFMAN ET AL. Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. For each task, the means in each age group that are marked with a different superscript (e.g., "a" versus "b") are significantly different from one another as measured by t test (all ps Ͻ .05).
lary and age group. This allowed an estimate of the independent variance accounted for by executive function abilities. Table 7 presents this data. Stroop performance accounted for independent variance in avoiding false alarms and improving performance on the video only and neither Source questions. Furthermore, it is not the case that some correlation coefficients just failed to reach significance whereas others did. There were significant differences in the partial correlations between (a) Stroop and false alarms versus Stroop and hits, t (56) Working memory accounted for unique variance on four of six types of memory question, including hits and not including false alarms. Thus, the pattern of correlations was quite different to that obtained with Stroop performance. Although working memory did correlate with the tasks loading highly on episodic memory, it did not have a selective relation with such tasks. Instead, it seemed more related to general memory abilities.
Relation of false alarms to source memory. At the outset we drew links between false alarms and source monitoring. These ideas gain support from the negative correlations between false alarms and (a) the video only Source questions, r(59) ϭ Ϫ.29, p Ͻ .05, (b) the tape only Source questions, r(59) ϭ Ϫ.29, p Ͻ .05, and (c) the neither Source questions, r(59) ϭ Ϫ.54, p Ͻ .01. As expected, false alarms did not correlate with hits, r(59) ϭ .13, ns, or the both Source questions, r(59) ϭ .10, ns. 
DISCUSSION
Certainty. This study tested several hypotheses. First, we examined whether children would give lower certainty ratings when they were incorrect on a Source or recognition question than when they were correct. If there were such positive correlations then children would have recognized when they might have made false alarms, missed hits, and were incorrect about the source of an event. Over all three age groups there were no significant correlations between certainty and performance on the nine "No" Happen questions (false alarms). Thus, children showed no recognition of when they had made a false alarm. It is conceivable that a lack of variance on the "No" Happen questions might account for some of this tendency in that it was not possible to compute correlations for three questions in the older two age groups because no false alarms were made. Nevertheless, in each age group there were at least some significant positive correlations for "Yes" Happen questions (overall, 18/29 ϭ 62%) with similar variance so that it is not unreasonable to expect certainty to sometimes correlate with "No" Happen questions. Children's difficulty rating certainty when they make false alarms can be explained by a failure to inhibit retrieval processes based on familiarity or gist. Likewise, their ability to rate certainty when they achieve a hit can be explained by a reliance on feelings of familiarity which in this case yield a correct answer.
Besides being able to rate certainty on the "Yes" Happen questions, the youngest children were also able to rate certainty on two of four both Source questions. Again this can be explained by a reliance on familiarity when answering the both Source questions and the stronger familiarity cues with two repetitions of an event. These successes show that certainty ratings were sensitive measures of confidence in the 6-year-olds and hence, that their inability to rate certainty in the other conditions was not due to insensitivity of the confidence measure. Instead, we think that younger children's general inability to identify source and rate certainty when an event occurred in the video only or tape only stems from an overreliance on familiarity information and the higher demands these questions placed on episodic memory or memory for context.
In addition to being able to rate certainty on the both Source questions, the 8-and 10-year-old children could also rate certainty on the tape only Source questions. At the same time there were many occasions when even the older children were not able to rate certainty on the video only and neither Source questions. Children's inability to understand when they had misidentified a source on the neither Source questions is consistent with their difficulty when they made a false alarm, because the neither Source questions are secondary measures of children's ability to recognize that an event had not occurred. These difficulties can again be explained as a failure of episodic memory and inhibitory ability.
The ability of the 8-and 10-year-olds to rate certainty on the tape only Source questions, but not on the video only Source questions, has an interesting explanation. Recall that the main error when an event had occurred in the video only was to say that it had occurred in both sources. In contrast, when an event had occurred in the tape only, children were as likely to err by saying the event had occurred in neither source as to say it had occurred in both sources. These error patterns make sense in that the additional visual cues when an event occurs in the video only relative to the tape only will increase the familiarity of the event and lead children to claim a "video only" event occurred in both sources.
The suggestion, then, is that children use both familiarity and episodic information when attempting to identify source. If there is no episodic information (because an event has not occurred) then a decision based on a vague sense of familiarity will sometimes result in a false alarm. If there are both episodic and familiarity cues available (because an event occurred in the audio tape), then familiarity cues are not so strong as to override the episodic information that is available. Hence, older children, who are able to inhibit familiarity-based retrieval and whose episodic memory abilities are superior, are often able to answer tape only Source questions and to assess certainty in their conclusion. If there is episodic information but the familiarity cues are stronger (because an event has occurred in the video and the additional visual information creates a stronger sense of familiarity), then the familiarity cues might often take precedence and lead to mistaken assessments that the event occurred in both sources and confidence in this conclusion (because the event is so familiar). Finally, if there is episodic information and the familiarity-based information is particularly strong (because the event has occurred in both sources), then either the heightened familiarity or the consistency between the two types of cues would allow a correct inference that the event had occurred in both sources.
In other words, the video only task presents a difficulty because the greater familiarity leads to the feeling that the event occurred in both sources and relative certainty that this was the case. The lower level of familiarity associated with the tape only events enables episodic information to play a larger role. The net result is that older children, whose episodic abilities are superior, do generally better on the tape only Source questions than on the video only Source questions.
In sum, the certainty ratings are a helpful tool for revealing new information about children's false alarms and source monitoring. Although older children were above chance on the Source questions and did not make many false alarms, the certainty ratings revealed an incomplete understanding because they often failed to distinguish when they were correct from when they were incorrect.
Relation to executive functions. A second aim of the present study was to investigate the relation between (a) executive function abilities (inhibition and working memory) and (b) source monitoring, false alarms, and hits. We predicted that executive function abilities should correlate with the ability to avoid making false alarms and with performance on the video only, tape only, and neither Source questions, but not hits or the both Source questions. There was mixed support for these predictions. Inhibitory ability was uniquely involved in avoiding false alarms and in source monitoring, but working memory played a more general role in assisting memory.
The link between inhibition and false alarms makes sense if false alarms stem from a failure to employ effortful strategic processes at retrieval and to inhibit recognition based on automatic processes of familiarity or gist information. Likewise, the link between inhibition and neither Source question performance makes sense because the neither Source questions were secondary measures of children's ability to avoid false alarms. The link between inhibition and the video only Source questions is consistent with the idea that there are stronger familiarity cues with visual information (as opposed to auditory information only), and this increases the demands to inhibit automatic familiarity-based retrieval processes (see above).
Working memory accounted for unique variance on two out of four tasks that were hypothesized to be correlates: the tape only and video only Source questions. We predicted these correlations because: (a) working memory and source memory will both benefit from consciously mediated strategic processes, (b) working memory and source performance will benefit from metacognitive insight into one's previous experience of context, and (c) correlations between working memory and source have been obtained in adults.
The failure for working memory to correlate with false alarms or the neither Source questions was not a complete surprise because we hypothesized that working memory would correlate with false alarms to the extent that avoiding false alarms depended on source monitoring ability. Our results are consistent with the idea that false alarms occur, in part, because children fail to inhibit inappropriate retrieval strategies, but not because they cannot recruit adequate processing resources to instigate appropriate retrieval strategies.
An unexpected finding was that working memory also correlated with the ability to achieve hits (a measure of recognition memory). Hits can be made on the basis of familiarity alone so we hypothesized that there is no compelling reason for them to correlate with working memory. In retrospect, our findings are probably not especially surprising. For instance, Glisky et al. (1995) found a correlation of r ϭ .46, p ϭ .02, between performance on a battery of executive function tasks and source monitoring and a correlation of r ϭ .25, ns, between executive function and recognition memory. Although their correlation between executive function and recognition memory was not significant, it was clearly not zero and was in the same region as our correlation. Glisky et al.'s executive function battery included five tasks, some of which tested working memory (e.g., backwards digit span) and some of which tested inhibition (e.g., a verbal fluency task). Thus, it is not possible to establish whether working memory correlated more highly with recognition memory in their sample than inhibition. In other words, Glisky et al.'s results are quite possibly consistent with our own. Indeed, one might posit that the correlation between working memory and hits in our study stems not from retrieval processes but from assisting encoding of events. In sum, our findings are consistent with the idea that in contrast to inhibitory ability, working memory plays a more general role in assisting memory.
The selective pattern of correlations that we obtained between inhibitory ability and memory is notable because correlations with executive function tasks and between different executive function skills tend to be relatively unstable (e.g., Parkin, 1998) . Indeed, the fact that our results are consistent with numerous studies with adults, and the selective way in which inhibitory ability correlated with only some insights but not others, helps validate our findings. The specificity of these relations shows that there is something particular about source monitoring and false alarms that is related to inhibitory abilities. To repeat, we believe this is the greater need for inhibition of familiarity-based retrieval processes in certain kinds of memory tasks.
Eyewitness testimony. We conclude by noting that our results have practical implications for eyewitness testimony. Source monitoring errors are seen as a possible cause of suggestibility in children (e.g., Ceci, Loftus, Leichtman, & Bruck, 1994; Schacter, Kagan, & Leichtman, 1995) . Our results are consistent with the idea that children may sometimes agree to information, yet have insight that their claims may be inaccurate. This is particularly true when children are asked whether events have occurred (and they have occurred). Furthermore, it is sometimes true for older children when they are asked about the source of an event. One could imagine, then, that certainty ratings would help to disambiguate some instances where children confuse the occurrence or source of an event but are aware that they may be wrong. At the same time, certainty ratings may be of little use in many instances such as when children are asked about whether events have occurred (and they have not occurred) and sometimes when there is more than one source and the event in question occurs in a single source.
Many questions remain. For instance, at what age do children reliably show insight into their lack of knowledge when assessing source when an event occurs in only one of two sources? Would similar results be obtained when there are more than two sources? Would similar results be obtained in a genuine suggestibility paradigm? Would elderly or frontally damaged adults rate their certainty correctly when making false alarms or distinguishing source? We predict that they frequently would not because, like young children, they often genuinely believe in events occurring when they make a false alarm and have no understanding that an alternative source is possible when they commit a source monitoring error. Clearly, there remain many questions for future research to explore.
